Titan submersible disaster inquiry hears shocking testimonies

by Mick the Ram

At the conclusion of a two-week US Coast Guard hearing into last year’s tragic Titan submersible implosion that killed five people on a North Atlantic dive to the wreckage of Titanic, the findings will now be scrutinized by the Marine Board of Investigation and a comprehensive account drawn up.

The Titan lost contact with its support ship on the morning of June 18, 2023, less than two hours after it began its ill-fated descent and authorities found its wreckage on the floor of the Ocean days later, several hundred yards from the famous liner’s remains.

On board the sub were Stockton Rush, the 61-year-old CEO of expedition promoter OceanGate, British-Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood, who was 48, with his 19-year-old son Suleman, Hamish Harding, a 58-year-old British businessman and the eldest person with the party was Paul-Henri Nargeolet, aged 77, a former French navy diver and renowned explorer.

Over the two-week period more than two dozen witnesses, ranging from former employees of OceanGate, to industry experts and even previous paying passengers, gave enlightening testimonies, pointing towards Mr Rush’s unwavering ambitions, which many alluded to him putting profits ahead of a safety, shunning regulations or carrying out robust enough testing, and shockingly ignoring repeated warnings about the potential danger of his experimental vessel.

The board’s final report will almost certainly contain recommendations for new safety regulations for submersibles and very possibly a referral to the US Justice Department for criminal prosecutions, with the likelihood of private lawsuits already advancing.

Incredible pressure at depth

Titanic’s wreck sits on the seabed, nearly 2.4 miles (3.8km) below the surface, making it an extremely challenging environment for those wishing to visit the site. A descent of that depth can take two hours to achieve and once below 3,300ft (1,000m) sunlight is unable to penetrate meaning that complete darkness takes over.

Pressure on a submersible increases dramatically, indeed at the wreckage of the Titanic that pressure is estimated to be 390 times greater than experienced above the surface. Any vessel travelling to such a level needs to be able to withstand those incredible forces and would usually have thick metal hulls to enable it to do so safely.

Four days to find debris

Once the Titan submersible lost contact with its mother-ship: Polar Prince, on 18 June 2023, there were immediate concerns. It had been down for around one hour 45 minutes and shortly afterwards the Navy detected a possible implosion sound. It was later explained that the event would have been instantaneous with no time to even register what was about to occur.

Debris was finally found after four days of searching and the purpose of the inquiry was to uncover the details of what led to the tragedy and find recommendations that could prevent future deadly voyages.

Host of previous incidents

The first week of the hearing heard from industry experts and witnesses, that included a previous paying passenger, Fred Hagen, who listed a whole host of incidents that were each of massive concern. Things such as incorrect weighting of the vessel causing a dangerous imbalance, and failed thrusts he said were hugely worrying.

In total the US Coast Guard was able to highlight 118 technical incidents on the submersible’s dives that took place in 2022 and 2023.

Major flaws in design

Amongst the other significant issues with the Titan’s design were the viewport window, which was only rated to a depth of 1,300m (4,300ft) by its manufacturer, but Titan was diving almost three times deeper.

Titan’s hull was also an unusual shape, being cylindrical, rather than spherical, meaning that the effects of the crushing pressure of the deep were not distributed equally.

Additionally, it was made out of carbon fibre – a highly unconventional material as its considered to be unreliable at depth and would have become weaker with every dive it took.

Changed description to experimental

Concerns had also been raised prior to the tragedy relating to the OceanGate‘s website content which experts had said was “confusing and misleading” and implied the Titan was “classed” meaning certified to industry standards – which it was not.

Mr Rush did update the text and altered its description to “experimental”. However, he made the conscious decision NOT to get the vessel classified as in his own words: “the process would have taken too long,” and he even questioned whether the Classification experts, actually understood his technology.

Essentially, the inquiry was made aware that Mr Rush was someone that would not budge on an opinion and few if any people were allowed to say “no” to him.

Unwilling to listen to safety concerns

A transcript read out at the inquiry was particularly revealing and came from a key Oceangate meeting held all the way back in 2018. It captured the company’s CEO Stockton Rush in a heated discussion with David Lochridge – the former director of marine operations, along with three other Oceangate employees.

Mr Lochridge was called to the meeting after compiling a “quality inspection report”, which raised multiple problems with the sub’s design. He pointed out what he viewed as real safety concerns,concerns he stressed had been mentioned verbally, but dismissed by everybody.

In the transcript Mr Rush replies that he had listened to the worries but made the remark that there were risks, but insisted that in his opinion the project was one of the safest things he would ever do. He even brought his own granddaughter into the conversation saying he intended to be around for her for a long time to come, and underlined his point by saying nobody was dying on his watch.

David Lochridge was subsequently fired after that meeting.

Cash flow issues

OceanGate’s Director of Administration, Amber Bay said that if a customer didn’t get to see the Titanic, then no refunds were offered, but the passenger was invited to try again on another expedition.

This she explained had the effect of creating a backlog and added to costs and as a consequence, the dives were then being funded by deposits from the next group of passengers, which she accepted did lead to a cash flow problem.

Backing this up in even stronger terms was the evidence of Phil Brooks, OceanGate’s former director of engineering. He said the company was very much “strapped for cash” and this led to them “compromising on safety way too much.”

Possible criminal investigation to follow

The board chairman, Jason Neubauer, faced up to questions following the conclusion of the inquiry and said his priority now is to get the investigation done expeditiously, because he feels that there are global issues at stake.

With that in mind, he was unable to offer a firm timeline on a final report. He did add however, that if there were to be a criminal investigation conducted, it would be completely separate from the administrative investigation.